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The early literature on time consistency, developed by Kydland and Prescott [19], Calvo [8], and
others, compares environments which have technologies for a government to make binding future commitments
with environments which have no such technologies. The main point of this work was to show that the
policies chosen in an environment without commitment may be quite different from the Ramsey policies, those
chosen in an environment with commitment. Recently, however, work by Barro and Gordon [5], Stokey [25],
and Chari and Kehoe [10], has shown that in environments without commitment, trigger-type mechanisms can
often support the Ramsey policies. (For a discussion of trigger mechanisms, see Friedman [13], Green and
Porter [17], and Fudenberg and Maskin [16].)
A key feature of the models in the recent literature is that they are repeated versions of a one-period
model. Technically, these models have no state variables like capital, debt, or money that link periods. Most
models of interest in macroeconomics, however, have such state variables. This paper shows that the outcomes
of such trigger mechanisms in dynamic environments may be fundamentally different from the outcomes of
such mechanisms in repeated environments. We concentrate on a classic problem in the time consistency
literature, namely, the incentive for a government to default on debt.
In an early contribution, Prescott [22] analyzed a simple infinite horizon economy in which the
government finances a given stream of expenditures by raising distorting labor taxes and by selling debt. He
found that if there is no technology for making binding future commitments, the government always defaults
on outstanding debt to avoid levying distorting taxes. In the equilibrium of his model, the value of government
debt is zero and the government runs a continuously balanced budget. This early work presents a challenge
to economists interested in explaining why governments do not default on their inherited debt. An intuitive
explanation is based on a trigger mechanism: governments fear that, if they default, private agents will be less
willing to lend to them in the future. If the losses incurred by the government from future borrowing
difficulties outweigh the current benefits from defaulting, the government will not default.
In this paper, we explore this intuitive explanation in a formal general equilibrium model. We
consider the types of mechanisms which are used in repeated models by Barro and Gordon [5], Stokey [25],
and Chari and Kehoe [10], to support the Ramsey outcomes. These mechanisms specify infinite reversion to5
the limit of the finite horizon equilibrium. In our environment the analogous mechanisms specify infinite
reversion to a (weak) Markov equilibrium. In this Markov equilibrium the government defaults on positive
debt and accepts payments owed to it by consumers (negative debt) in order to avoid levying distorting taxes.
Consumers never lend to the government but do borrow from it. The government smooths taxes as well as
it can subject to the constraint that in each period it can lend but never borrow.
Our first result is that, no matter what the discount factor is, trigger mechanisms which specify
reversion to this Markov equilibrium cannot support equilibria with positive debt. In particular, they cannot
support Ramsey outcomes with positive debt. This result is strikingly different from the results in the existing
macroeconomic literature in which such trigger mechanisms can be used to support the Ramsey outcomes.
The key reason for the difference is that the existing literature considers repeated models without state variables
that link periods. Our model has debt as a state variable and thus gives rise to a dynamic rather than a
repeated game.
The intuition for the result that these trigger mechanisms which specify reversion to this Markov
equilibrium cannot support positive debt is as follows. Suppose by way of contradiction that such trigger
mechanisms produce an outcome with positive debt. Consider the date at which the debt, measured in terms
of its present value at date zero, is maximal. Let the government default on the debt at this date and, for the
moment, leave all policies and allocations unchanged. Now government revenues must exceed expenditures
at this date, that is the government must run a surplus, since the debt is maximal at this date. Similarly the
cumulated value of revenues from this date to any subsequent date must exceed the cumulated value of
expenditures. Thus, the government must be a net creditor at each date after the maximal date. It turns out
that the Markov equilibrium allocations maximize utility subject to the constraint that the government can lend
but never borrow. Therefore, reversion to this Markov equilibrium cannot support positive debt.
The Markov equilibrium described above seems like a natural starting point for an analysis of default
on government debt. In the model the government clearly has an incentive to default on positive debt and to
accept negative debt. Realizing this consumers have an incentive not to lend to the government but they are6
quite willing to borrow from it. It is natural to expect that these incentives imply that government debt can
be negative but never positive. Since the government is maximizing consumer’s utility it is also natural to
expect that the equilibrium outcomes maximize consumer utility subject to the constraints that government debt
is never positive and, of course, that revenues are raised through distorting taxes. One might even speculate
that in a finite horizon version of our economy that this is the unique equilibrium. It turns out that this is not
true. We show by way of a two-period example that there can be multiple Markov equilibria. In the example
there are two Markov equilibria. In both of them government debt is negative, but only one of them
maximizes utility subject to the constraint that the government debt is never positive. It is straightforward to
extend this example to a long finite or infinite horizon. We show how such multiple equilibria can be used
to construct trigger mechanisms along the lines of Benoit and Krishna [6], which support positive debt in either
finite or infinite horizon versions of the model.
This paper is related to a large literature in game theory on the Folk theorem for infinite horizon
games. This theorem cannot be applied directly in our model since our setup differs from the standard setup
in repeated games as in Fudenberg and Maskin [16] in two respects. First, in standard repeated games there
are several large agents while in our model there is one large agent and a large number of competitive private
agents. As we discussed in Chari-Kehoe [10], even in repeated models with competitive private agents the
standard Folk theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin [16] does not hold. In such repeated models a modified
version of this theorem does hold and it is similar in spirit to the modifications discussed in Fudenberg, Kreps,
and Maskin [14] and Fudenberg and Levine [15] who study repeated games with a long-lived player and a
sequence of short-lived players. Second, our model is not a repeated game, but rather it is a dynamic game
with debt as a state variable. The quantity of debt owed by consumers affects the set of feasible outcomes.
This debt is, of course, determined by past decisions. In contrast, in repeated games the history does not affect
the set of feasible outcomes even if it affects equilibrium outcomes.
Related work on debt and default includes Calvo [9], Grossman and Van Huyck [18], Bulow and
Rogoff [7], and Atkeson [2]. Calvo developed models which generate positive debt in equilibrium. This debt7
emerges not because of trigger strategies, but rather because there is a direct cost of default. The main focus
of Calvo’s work is to investigate how such costs can generate a multiplicity of equilibria which are similar to
the type in our two period example. Bulow and Rogoff [7] consider a partial equilibrium model of
international borrowing and lending with constant interest rates, and prove a stronger result, namely, that no
equilibrium can have positive debt. Some of our arguments are related to theirs except that ours are more
complicated because of general equilibrium interactions of consumer’s expectations of future policies and the
set of feasible current government policies. Grossman and Van Huyck and Atkeson use reputation-type
arguments to support positive debt in a model of international borrowing and lending.
In this paper we will consider a deterministic economy. It will become clear that our results go
through in an economy with uncertainty. This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the model
which is a variant of the optimal fiscal policy models of Prescott [22], Barro [4], Lucas and Stokey [20], and
Persson, Persson, and Svensson [21]. Section 2 considers an environment with commitment and characterizes
the resulting equilibrium, called a Ramsey equilibrium, which is a dynamic counterpart of the static equilibrium
considered by Ramsey [23]. We characterize the Ramsey equilibrium as a solution to a planning problem.
Section 3 considers an environment without commitment. We allow the allocation rules of consumers and
policy plans of the government to depend on the whole history of past government policies. We define a
sustainable equilibrium to be a set of allocation rules and policy plans that satisfy sequential rationality
conditions for both the private agents and the government. Section 4 characterizes a Markov equilibrium and
the set of outcomes that can be sustained by a reversion to it. We show that the Markov policies and
allocations solve a certain programming problem. In Section 5 we show that no equilibrium with positive debt
can be supported by reverting to the Markov equilibrium. Section 6 contains some examples that illustrate this
result. In Section 7 we show that even in a two-period example there are two equilibria—a good one with a
low interest rate and a bad one with a high interest rate. We show how trigger mechanisms which specify
reversion to the bad equilibrium after a default can support outcomes with positive debt. Section 8 concludes.8
1. The Economy
Consider a simple production economy populated by a large number of identical, infinitely-lived
consumers. In each period t, there are two goods: labor and a consumption good. A constant returns-to-scale
technology is available to transform one unit of labor into one unit of output. The output can be used for
private consumption or for government consumption. Let t and ct denote the per capita levels of labor and
private consumption. The per capita level of government consumption in each period, denoted gt,i s
exogenously specified. Feasibility requires that
ct +g t = t. (1.1)





where 0 < β < 1 and U is increasing in consumption, decreasing in labor, twice differentiable, strictly concave
and bounded. We assume that the endowment of leisure time is given by ¯ so that ≤ ¯ and that the utility
function satisfies the Inada conditions: limc→0Uc(c, ) = ∞ for all < ¯ and lim →¯U (c, ¯)=− ∞ for all
c, where Uc and U denote the partial derivatives of the utility function with respect to consumption and labor
respectively. In addition, we assume that consumption and leisure are normal goods.
Government consumption is financed by a proportional tax on labor income and by debt. Let τt
denote the tax rate on labor income in period t. Following Lucas and Stokey [20] and Rogers [24], we allow
for government debt of all maturities. Lucas and Stokey show in an environment similar to ours except that
the government cannot default, that the outcomes with and without commitment to tax rates coincide if and
only if the government has access to debt of all maturities. We allow for debt of all maturities because we
want to focus on the time inconsistency problem caused by default and avoid complications of the time
inconsistency problem caused by limiting the set of government maturities. At the beginning of period t, the
net outstanding claims on the government are t−1b=( t−1bs)
∞
s=t where t−1bs is a claim to goods at time s. At time
t, consumers buy new debt claims which result in a net debt position tb. Let δt ∈ [0,1] denote the default rate
on government debt outstanding in period t. Here δt = 0 corresponds to complete repayment; δt =1 ,t o9
complete default; and 0 < δt < 1, to partial default. (Think of δt as a tax on debt.) Let tqs be the price at time
t of the debt claim maturing at time s. The consumer’s budget constraint can then be written as
ct − (1−τt) t + tq tb = (1−δt)tq t−1b (1.3)
f o rt=0 ,..., ∞, with the initial debt given by −1b and where here and throughout the paper we will use the
notation that for any r ≥ t−1 ,tq rb=
∞
s=r+1 tqsr bs. We normalize tqt to be equal to 1 for all t. (Notice that
we assume a single default rate on outstanding debt rather than letting the default rate vary by maturity. This
assumption simplifies the notation and the analysis considerably. We conjecture that allowing the default rate
to vary by maturity would not alter our main results.) An allocation for consumers is a sequence x = (xt)
∞
t= 0
where x = (ct, t,tb). The government sets labor tax rates, default rates, and debt prices to finance an exogenous
sequence of government consumption. The government’s budget constraint is
τtt−g t + tq tb = (1−δt)tq t−1b. (1.4)
The government policy at t is πt =( τt,δt,tq) where tq=( tqs)
∞
s=t+1. We assume that τt ≤ 1, δt ∈ [0,1], and for
technical reasons there are bounds d1 > 0 and d2 < 0 such that, for all t and s, tbs ≤ d1 and tbs ≥ d2. These
bounds ensure that neither consumers nor the government will use Ponzi schemes.
2. Commitment
Consider an environment in which there is an institution or a commitment technology through which
the government can bind itself to a particular sequence of policies once and for all at time zero. In particular,
the government can commit to never defaulting on its debt. The government technology for commitment is
formalized by having the government choose an infinite sequence of numbers π =( πt)
∞
t= 0at the beginning of
time and then having consumers choose their allocations. Since the government needs to predict how
consumers will respond to its policies, consumer behavior is described by rules that associate government
policies with allocations. Formally, an allocation rule is a sequence of functions f = (ft)
∞
t= 0that maps policies
into allocations. A Ramsey equilibrium is a policy π and an allocation rule f that satisfy the following
conditions: (i) the policy π maximizes t
∞
=0β
tU(ct(π), t(π)) subject to
τtt (π)−g t + tq tb(π) = (1−δt)tq t−1b(π) for all t; (2.1)10
(ii) for every policy π′, the allocation f(π′) maximizes (1.2) subject to (1.3) and (1.4).
The allocations in a Ramsey equilibrium solve a simple programming problem called the Ramsey
problem. We will let Rt denote the value of the government surplus at t; namely, Rt =U c(τtt −gt). The first





Using this condition and feasibility, ct +g t = t, it follows that in any equilibrium Rt =U cct +U t. We have,
then,
Proposition 1 (The Ramsey Equilibrium). The consumption and labor allocations, c and , in the Ramsey























Proof. In the Ramsey equilibrium the government must satisfy its budget constraint taking as given the
allocation rule f(π). These requirements impose restrictions on the set of allocations the government can
achieve by varying its policies. We claim that these restrictions are summarized by (2.3) and (2.4). We first
show that these restrictions imply (2.3) and (2.4). To see that these restrictions imply (2.3) note that
subtracting (1.3) from (1.4) gives (2.4). We next show that these requirements imply (2.4). Consider the
allocation rule f(π). For any policy π, using the Inada conditions and the theorems of Weitzman [26] and
Ekeland and Schienkman [12], the consumer’s first order conditions are (2.2), and
tqs = t+1qs(1−δt+1)βUc(ct+1, t+1)/Uc(ct, t) (2.5)11
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Multiplying (1.3) by β
tUc(ct, t) summing over t and using (2.2), (2.5), and (2.6) gives
β






Now if at an allocation the value of the initial debt, namely, β
tUc(ct, t)−1bt, is positive it is optimal for the
government to default by setting δ0 = 1. If it is somewhat negative it is optimal for the government to accept
it by setting δ0 = 0. If the value of the initial debt is so negative that it exceeds the whole present value of
government spending it is optimal for the government to accept just enough of this debt so that it can set taxes
equal to zero forever. Thus, using optimality by the government, we can reduce (2.7) to (2.4). Hence the
requirement that the government sets δ0 optimally and that it satisfy its budget constraint together with the
requirement that allocations are consistent with the allocation rule f(π) imply (2.3) and (2.4).
Next, given any allocations c and that satisfy (2.3) and (2.4) we can construct sequences of tax
rates, default rates, debt prices, and levels of debt such that these allocations are consistent with the allocation
rule f and the government’s budget constraints. Equation (2.4) gives the tax rates. There are a large number
of ways to set the rest of the policies. To derive the debt prices recursively use (2.5) to get
tqs = (1−δt+1)(1−δt+2) (1−δs)β
s−tUc(cs, s)/Uc(ct, t) (2.8)
where tqt = 1. To derive the debt and default sequences multiply the consumer’s budget constraint by
β








Any sequence δ and b which satisfy (2.9), debt prices which satisfy (2.8) and tax rates which satisfy (2.4) will
decentralize the Ramsey consumption and labor allocations. One particular way is to set the default rate for
δt,t≥ 1 identically equal to zero, set the debt prices tqs = β
s−tUc(cs, s)/Uc(ct, t) and the debt sequence by (2.9)
with the δ’s set to zero. Notice that (2.9) pins down the present value of the debt but not its composition.





and tbs =0f o rs>t+1 .
As the proof of this proposition makes clear the Ramsey equilibrium pins down only the present value
of the future debt and not its composition. As Lucas and Stokey have emphasized, however, in environments
without commitment the composition of the debt affects the incentives of the government in the future when
it optimizes given some inherited debt. Indeed in that environment the first order conditions at any date t will
be affected by the composition of the debt. We will study such an environment in the next section. For now,
however, we can get a sense of the importance of the composition of the debt in the environment with commit-
ment. To see this imagine solving the Ramsey problem at date 0 and suppose that, at the Ramsey allocations,
the present value of the initial debt is negative. The first order conditions at date t would be
Uc +U +λ[Rc+R ] − λ[Rc+R ]−1bt = 0 (2.11)
where the partial derivatives of U and R are evaluated at (ct, t) and λ is the Lagrange multiplier on (2.3). Now
suppose −1b ˆ is another debt sequence with the same present value at the original Ramsey allocations, namely
∞
t=0




but with a different composition of debt. Clearly the original equilibrium will, typically, no longer be optimal
because the first order conditions (2.11) will not be satisfied at the new debt level −1b ˆ
t. Because of this feature
it will be important to allow the government to issue multiperiod debt in the environment without commitment.
Indeed, if we constrain the government to issue only one period debt it would constrain the set of equilibrium
allocations. For an extreme example of this phenomenon, recall that Lucas and Stokey studied an environment
which is the same as this one except that they did not allow default. Their main result was that if there was
a rich enough maturity structure for the debt then the Ramsey equilibrium is time consistent. If, however, debt
is restricted, say, to being only one period debt then, typically, the Ramsey equilibrium is not time consistent.13
For later use we will say an outcome (π,x) is attainable under commitment if it satisfies the
government budget constraints and x maximizes consumer utility at date zero subject to consumer budget
constraints. From the proof of the proposition it follows immediately that an outcome is attainable under
commitment if the associated allocations satisfy (2.3) and (2.7). Intuitively, this requirement captures the limits
on what the government could ever hope to achieve when faced with optimizing private agents even if it could
commit to suboptimal policies.
3. No Commitment
Consider an environment in which no commitment technologies are available to the government.
Formally, the lack of commitment by the government is modeled by having the government choose policy
sequentially. In each period, the government and the consumers can vary their decisions depending on the
history of government policies up to the time the decision is made. At the beginning of period t, the
government chooses a current policy as a function of the history ht−1 =( πs s=0,...,t−1) together with a
contingency plan for setting future policies for all possible future histories. Let σt(ht−1) denote the time t labor
tax rate, default rate, and price of debt chosen by the government when faced with history ht−1. After the
government sets current policy, consumers make their decisions. Faced with a history ht =( h t−1,πt), consumers
choose time t levels of consumption, labor supply, and debt holdings, denoted ft(ht), together with a
contingency plan for choosing future allocations. (The reader may wonder why the histories do not include
consumers’ decisions. For a discussion of this point see Chari and Kehoe [10].)
In order to define a sustainable equilibrium, we need to explain how policy plans induce future
histories. Given a history ht−1, the policy plan σ induces future histories by ht =( h t−1,σt(ht−1)) and so on.
Given a history ht−1, a continuation policy of σ is (σt(ht−1),σt+1(ht−1,σt(ht−1)),...). Similarly, given a history ht
and a policy plan σ, a continuation allocation of f is (ft(ht),ft+1(ht,σt+1(ht),...).
Consider the situation of the government in period t. Given some history ht−1 and given that future







τs(hs−1) s(hs)−g s + sq(hs−1) sb(hs)=( 1−δs(hs−1))sq(hs−1) s−1b(hs−1) (3.2)
where for all s ≥ t the future histories are induced by σ from ht−1.
Consider next a private agent in period t. Given some history ht and given that future policies evolve






ct(ht) − (1−τt) t(ht)+tq tb(ht) = (1−δt)tq t−1b(ht−1) (3.4)
and, fors>t ,
cs(hs)−( 1−τs(hs−1)) s(hs)+sq(hs−1) sb(hs)=( 1−δs(hs−1))sq(hs−1) s−1b(hs−1) (3.5)
together with the debt constraints for s ≥ t, d2 ≤ sb(hs) ≤ d1 where πt is given in ht and for all s > t the future
histories are induced by σ from ht.A sustainable equilibrium is a pair (σ,f) that satisfies the following
conditions: (i) Given the allocation rule f, for every history ht−1 the continuation policy of σ solves the
government’s problem; (ii) given a policy plan σ, for every history ht the continuation allocation of f solves
the consumer’s problem. Note that in the definition we require that both the consumers and the government
act optimally for every history of policies—even for histories which are not induced by the government’s
strategy or histories which have violated feasibility. This requirement is analogous to the requirement of
perfection in a game.
4. A Markov Equilibrium
We begin by constructing a simple equilibrium called the Markov equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
government debt is never positive. We then examine those outcomes that can be supported by trigger-type
mechanisms which specify reversion to the Markov equilibrium after deviations. We characterize the set of
outcomes that can be supported by these trigger mechanisms by a set of inequalities. In Sections 5 and 6, we
develop the implications of this characterization for supporting positive debt.15
A sustainable equilibrium is said to be (utility) Markov if for any pair of histories ht−1 and h ˆ
t−1 such
that t−1b(ht−1)=t−1b(h ˆ
t−1), (i) Vt(ht−1;σ,f) = Vt(h ˆ
t−1;σ,f), and (ii) Wt(ht−1,πt;σ,f) = Wt(h ˆ
t−1,πt;σ,f) where V and W
are defined in (3.1) and (3.3). Thus, in a Markov equilibrium the past history influences payoffs only to the
extent that it changes the inherited debt structure. Note that we require that payoffs be Markov rather than
that policy plans and allocation rules be Markov. A sustainable equilibrium is strategy-Markov if any two
histories yielding the same debt structure result in the same policies and allocations. Clearly, any strategy-
Markov equilibrium is utility-Markov. We elaborate on why we adopt this weaker definition below. (We
should note that in some parts of the literature, our notion of utility Markov is referred to as weak Markov and
strategy Markov is referred to as strong Markov. We think our terminology is more descriptive.)
To construct a Markov equilibrium, we proceed as follows. We define two programming problems
and use them to construct a candidate equilibrium. We then develop some properties of these problems which
we use to verify that the candidate equilibrium is sustainable. Consider, then, the first problem, called the
Markov problem which we use to define the policy plan for the government. This problem is defined at each
date t and for each level of the inherited debt t−1b as choosing allocations {cs, s,sb}
∞








subject to constraints (1.3) and (1.4) fors=t ,..., ∞ and
, (4.2) −U (cs, s)/Uc(cs, s)=( 1 − τs), s = t, ..., ∞
sqrUc(cs, s) = (1−δs+1)s+1q rβUc(cs+1, s+1), r ≥ s+1a n ds=t ,..., ∞, (4.3)




βs−rU(cs, s) ≥ Vr(r−1b), r = t + 1, ..., ∞,
where in (4.5) the term Vr(r−1b) denotes the maximized value of this same objective function at date r.
Constraints (1.3) and (1.4) are the consumer and government budget constraints, while constraints (4.2)–(4.4)
are the first order conditions to the consumer’s maximization problem.16
To gain some intuition for constraint (4.5), consider (4.1) at date 0 with some initial debt −1b and the
inequalities in (4.5) deleted. This problem gives both the Ramsey allocations and the Ramsey policies. To
see this note that problem (4.1) contains as constraints the first order conditions of consumers and the consumer
and government budget constraints. (Note that in the Ramsey problem in Proposition 1 we substituted out the
policies and simplified the resulting constraints.) Let 0b be the debt inherited at date 1 from problem (4.1) at
date 0 with constraint (4.5) deleted. Suppose that the value of this debt is positive. When at date 1 the
government solves this problem clearly it will default on the debt and thus will not carry out the date 0 plan.
Imposing constraint (4.5) on the date 0 problem ensures that the debt passed on to date 1 will be such that at
that date the government will not have an incentive to deviate from the date 0 plan. Similar logic applies to
other dates.
Consider next a second programming problem at date t which we use to define the consumer
allocation rule. This problem is defined as choosing allocations {cs, s,sb}
∞
s=t and policies {τs,δs,sq}
∞
s=t+1 given
t−1b and πt to solve the problem




subject to (1.3), (4.2)–(4.4), and (4.5) and subject to (1.4) for s = t + 1, ..., ∞. This problem imposes all the
constraints of (4.1) except the government budget constraint at date t.
To gain some intuition for (4.6) note that in constructing a sustainable equilibrium we must define
the consumer allocation rule for all histories including ones in which the government deviates. Now suppose
at t − 1 the consumers saved t−1b and at the beginning of period t the government deviates to some policy πt
which may not meet its period t budget constraint. Problem (4.6) defines the consumer’s optimal allocation
given that the consumer expects the government to follow the same policies as it does in problem (4.1) in all
periods s ≥ t + 1. We elaborate on this connection between problems (4.1) and (4.6) below.
We use program (4.1) to construct the policy plan for the government denoted by σ
m and we use
program (4.6) to construct the consumer allocation f
m. Suppose first, for simplicity, that for each value of the
state variables (4.1) and (4.6) have unique solutions. Then we define f
m as follows. Let f
m
0(h0) be the17
allocations which solve (4.6) at (−1b,π0) with −1b ≡ 0. Let f
m
1(h1) solve (4.6) at (0b(h0),π1) where 0b(h0) solves
(4.6) at (−1b,π0). Recursively, this procedure defines f
m
t(ht). Define σ
m as follows. For any history ht−1, let
t−1b
m(ht−1) be defined from the allocation rules f
m. Let σ
m
t(ht−1) be defined from the policies which solve (4.1)
at t−1b
m(ht−1).
Suppose next that at some date t with some inherited debt there is more than one solution to (4.1).
We then define σ t
m(ht−1) as follows. The history ht−1 yields the policy πt−1 which was chosen at date t − 1.
If πt−1 = σ
m
t− 1(ht−2) then choose the policy associated with problem (4.1) at date t − 1 while if πt−1 ≠σ
m
t− 1(ht−1)
then make an arbitrary selection. If πt−1 = σ
m
t− 1(ht−2) and there is indifference at date t − 1 as well repeat the
same procedure for period t − 2 and, so on. We resolve indifference about policies in defining f
m in a similar
fashion. It should be clear that at nodes of indifference by an agent the strategies specify the choice that would
lead to the highest utility for the agent at the previous node. In order to do so we need the strategies to depend
on the past histories. It is because of this need to resolve indifference in particular ways that we depart from
the more typical type of Markov equilibria, namely strong or strategy Markov equilibria and instead use weak
or utility Markov equilibria. We then have
Proposition 2 (A Markov Equilibrium). The policy plans and allocation rules (σ
m,f
m) form a sustainable
equilibrium.
In the proof of this proposition we will use the fact that, by construction, problems (4.1) and (4.6) are
recursive. That is, if problem (4.1) at t with some inherited debt gives a sequence of allocations {cs, s,sb}
∞
s=t
then at any future date r the continuation of the date t allocation namely, {cs, s,sb}
∞
s=r, solves (4.1) at date r
with inherited debt r−1b specified in the solution to the date t problem. To see this note that the only way the
continuation of the date t allocations would not be chosen for the date r problem was that there was some other
continuation allocation which yielded higher utility from r onward. But this would contradict the fact that in
the date t problem the allocation from r onward satisfied constraint (4.5). Thus problem (4.1) is recursive.
By a similar argument problem (4.6) is recursive.18
We will also use the fact that the solutions to (4.1) and (4.6) overlap in the obvious senses. The first
sense of overlap is that if we solve (4.6) at some arbitrary (t−1b,πt) then the solution to (4.6) from t + 1 onward
will coincide with the solution to (4.1) when (4.1) is started at the tb given in the solution to (4.6).
The second sense of overlap is that if we consider maximizing (4.6) with respect to πt subject to the
government budget constraint we will get the first element πt in the solution to (4.1). That is,
(4.7) Vt(t−1b) = max
πt
Wt(t−1b,πt)
subject to τtt+ tq tb=g t + (1−δt)tq t−1b where t and tb denote the functions given in the solution to (4.6)
evaluated at (t−1b,πt).
Proof. Consider first optimality by consumers. At date t, given some history ht =( h t−1,πt), consumers
maximize their utility (3.3) subject to (3.4) and (3.5) where future policies evolve according to σ
m. The first
order conditions for the consumer problem (3.3) are of the form (1.3) and (4.2)–(4.4). (Note that the
transversality condition is redundant given (4.4).) Now since the solutions to (4.1) and (4.6) overlap in the
first sense described above then the policies in the first order conditions (1.3) and (4.2)–(4.4) at the solution
to (4.6) are πt at t and, by the recursivity of (4.1), those generated by σ
m for s > t. That is, they are exactly
the policies the consumer faces when solving (3.3). By construction then the allocations generated from f
m
are an optimal response to these policies.
Consider next optimality by the government. At date t given some history ht−1 the government
chooses policies to maximize (3.1) subject to (3.2) where consumers future allocations evolve according to f
m.
By the results of Whittle ([27], Chap. 24, Thm. 2.1) and Abreu ([1], Prop. 1) it suffices to show that no one
shot deviations improve welfare. That is, we need only show that if consumers are following the allocation
rule f
m and that government policies from t + 1 onwards are generated from σ
m then there is no policy πt at
t which satisfies the government budget constraint and improves welfare. By construction of σ
m and f
m this
is equivalent to requiring that πt = σ
m
t(ht−1) solve problem (4.7) at t−1b=t−1b
m(ht−1). It is clear that it does by
the second sense in which the problems overlap.19
In the particular case when t−1b = 0, it is possible to obtain a sharp characterization of the Markov
outcomes. In order to obtain this characterization, first we simplify problem (4.1). We can use the standard
procedure similar to the one used in the proof of Proposition 1 to show that if some set of allocations
{cs, s,sb ˆ}
∞
s=t and policies {τs,δs,sq}
∞
s=t along with {δs}
∞
s=t solve (4.1) then the allocations {cs, s,sb}
∞
s=t solve





cs +g s = s, s = t, ..., ∞, (4.9)
β







s−rUc(cs, s)rbs = β





d1 ≤ rbs ≤ d2 r = t, ..., (4.12)
β
s−rU(cs, s) ≥ Vr(r−1b ) r=t+1 ,..., (4.13)
∞
s=r
where rbs = (1−δs+1) (1−δs)rb ˆ
s. Notice that, as mentioned after the proof of Proposition 1, in terms of
characterizing the constraint set at t there is no loss in setting the default rate from s ≥ t + 1 to zero. Thus
the Markov problem simplifies to choosing allocations {cs, s,sb}
∞
s=t and the initial default rate δt to solve (4.8).
Given any solution to this problem, it is clear that we can construct policies from the consumer’s first order
conditions so that the allocations and policies solve problem (4.1).
It should be clear that if the value of the debt at the optimal allocations is strictly positive than it is
also optimal to default completely by setting δt = 1. This same result holds at t + 1, t + 2, and so on.
Therefore, it follows that the solution to (4.8) must satisfy the condition that at all future dates, the value of
the debt at the optimal allocations must be nonpositive. Now multiplying (4.11) by β
s−r and summing from




βs−rRs = βs−rUc(cs, s)s−1br ≤ 0, r = t + 1, ...,∞,20
namely that the present value of the government’s surpluses is nonpositive at all future dates. Note that (4.14)
is a necessary condition for the continuation allocations from any history of the Markov equilibrium. We use
the necessity of (4.14) repeatedly in what follows.
We now turn to the characterization of the Markov allocation when t−1b = 0. In this case, it turns out
that the allocations which solve (4.8) solve the following programming problem














βsRs ≤ 0 for r = t + 1, ..., ∞.
The essential difference between problems (4.8) and (4.15) is that constraint (4.13) is replaced by
(4.18) which requires that the present value of the government’s surplus be nonpositive at all future dates. The
other inessential differences are that we have used optimality of the choice of δt to reduce (4.10) to (4.17) and
that in problem (4.15) the debt has been substituted out as a choice variable and thus we have dropped the
transition equation for debt (4.11). Note that, except for constraint (4.18), this problem is the same as the
programming problem in Lucas and Stokey [20].
In the Appendix we show
Proposition 4. Suppose that for some history ht−1, the inherited debt t−1b(ht−1) = 0. Then, there exists a debt
sequence tb, t+1b, ..., such that the allocations which solve problem (4.15) also solve problem (4.8).
The construction of the debt sequence we use in the proof is similar to the one in Lucas and Stokey
[20].21
5. Revert-to-Markov Equilibria
We can use the Markov equilibrium of Section 4 to help characterize other possible sustainable
outcomes. To characterize such outcomes, we use a modified version of the Markov equilibrium, which we
call the revert-to-Markov equilibria. (These equilibria are the natural competitive analogues of the
trigger-strategy equilibria of repeated games which specify reversion to the one-shot Nash equilibrium.) For
an arbitrary sequence (π,x), define the revert-to-Markov plans as follows. Consider first the allocation rules.
For any history ht, these plans specify the allocation xt given by x if the tax rates (π0,...,πt−1) have been chosen
according to π. If they have not, then revert to the Markov allocation rules in the following sense: Suppose
the first deviation, to policy π ˆt, occurs at date t. Then the allocation rules at date t are given by the solution
to (4.6) at (t−1b,π ˆt) where t−1b is given from x. For any policy πt+1 the allocation rules at date t + 1 are given
by the solution to (4.6) at (tb
m(ht),πt+1) where tb
m(ht) is the solution to (4.6) at (t−1b,π ˆt). Allocation rules for
all future dates are defined recursively. We define the reversion policy rules for the government analogously.
We then have
Proposition 5 (A Set of Sustainable Outcomes). An arbitrary sequence (π,x) can be supported by reverting to
the Markov plans if and only if (i) (π,x) is attainable under commitment and (ii) for every t the following
inequality holds:
β
sU(cs, s) ≥ Vt(t−1b). (5.1)
∞
s=t
Proof. Suppose some arbitrary sequence (π,x) satisfies conditions (i) and (ii). We show that the associated
revert-to-Markov plans constitute a sustainable equilibrium. Consider histories under which there have been
no deviations from π before time t. By condition (i), x is optimal for consumers at date zero when they are
faced with π, and thus it is clear that the continuation of x is optimal for consumers at date t when they are
faced with the continuation of π. Consider the situation of the government. When it is confronted with
revert-to-Markov allocation rules and given the fact that it will follow Markov policies from t + 1 on, the best22
one-shot deviation for the government is simply the Markov policy at t. Thus, using (4.7), condition (5.1)
guarantees that the government’s plans are optimal for such histories.
Consider now histories for which there has been a deviation at or before time t. The plans for the
consumers and the government specify the Markov plans from then on. By the same argument as in
Proposition 2, these plans are optimal.
We now turn to our main result. To prove this result, we assume that the value of the (negative)
surplus generated with zero taxes is uniformly bounded across different levels of government spending. Note
that with zero taxes the surplus Rt =U c(τtt −gt) reduces to Rt =− g tUc. Let c(gt) and (gt) maximize utility
subject to the resource constraint ct +g t = t. We assume
A = sup{gtUc(c(gt), (gt)) all gt} (5.2)
is finite. Under this assumption we have
Proposition 6 (Nonsupportability of Positive Debt). In any revert-to-Markov equilibrium the value of debt is
nonpositive at each date.
Proof. Suppose not, that is, suppose there is some sequence of allocations (ct, t) and associated sequence of
surpluses (Rt) which is the outcome of a revert-to-Markov equilibrium in which the debt is strictly positive at
some date. We will obtain a contradiction by showing there is a date for which deviating from the conjectured
outcome to the Markov equilibrium yields higher utility then continuing with the conjectured outcome. We
will accomplish this by constructing allocations which are better than the conjectured outcome but worse than
the Markov outcome.
To this end recall that the transversality condition on debt holdings (2.6) implies
β
sUc(cs, s)t−1bs = β








Let K = maxt
∞
s=tβ
sRs. Let this maximum be attained at date T, so
β
sRs ≥β





As a first step consider simply defaulting at date T and continuing with the original consumption and labor
allocations thereafter. Iterating on (4.11) we can show the date 0 value of the new debt sequence (tb ˆ) at date












which is zero at date T and by (5.4) is nonpositive for t ≥ T. (Note that the value of the new debt sequence
is uniquely defined, though, of course, not its composition.) Thus defaulting at T and continuing with the old
allocations clearly satisfies constraints (4.17) and (4.18) of the Markov problem. To generate a contradiction,
however, we need to modify this plan.
Clearly welfare can be improved from some future date T1 onward by switching to a plan that levies
smaller distorting taxes from then onward. Moreover, because the accumulated surplus is so large we can do
so and still have the associated debt sequence be nonnegative. In particular, consider levying zero taxes at
dates T1 and onward. The date 0 value of the loss in revenues under this plan is at most
β






By (5.3) for any ε > 0 we can choose t large enough so that the second term is less than ε for all T1 ≥ t.





Clearly then a plan of defaulting at T, pursuing the original policies until T1 − 1 then switching to zero taxes
after T1 is feasible for the Markov problem in that it satisfies (4.17) and (4.18). Since it leads to higher
welfare than the original equilibrium we have a contradiction.
Two remarks about this proposition are in order. First, the assumption on bounded (negative)
surpluses under the zero tax plan is quite innocuous. It is satisfied, for example, whenever there are a finite
number of values of government consumption. Second, under the assumption that −1b ≡ 0, the allocations
under the revert-to-Markov equilibrium are unique and solve problem (4.15). To see this, note that any revert-24
to-Markov equilibrium must have nonpositive debt at each date and so, such equilibrium allocations must
always satisfy (4.18). Since (4.15) maximizes utility over such allocations, the best policy for the government
is simply to revert to the Markov equilibrium at date zero.
6. Examples
In this section, we consider four examples, which illustrate the logic behind Proposition 5. In each
we let the initial debt sequence be identically zero. In such a case it follows immediately from combining the
first order conditions to the Ramsey problem (2.11) with the resource constraint (2.2) that the Ramsey
allocations only depend on the current level of spending gt. In particular, the optimal surplus Rt under the
Ramsey plan only depends on the current gt. We write the optimal surplus as R(gt). For concreteness let the
utility function be such that the surplus under the Ramsey plan R(gt) is decreasing. This will be true for a
variety of utility functions (see Chari and Kehoe [11]).
In Example 1, the Ramsey allocations never have positive debt and so are sustainable.
Example 1. Let gt = 0 for t even and gt = γ for t odd. If we interpret gt = 0 as peacetime consumption and
gt = γ as wartime consumption then the economy starts in peacetime then alternates between wartime and
peacetime. It is immediate that, under the Ramsey plan, the budget is balanced over each two-period cycle;
thus,
R(0) + βR(γ)=0 .
Since R(gt) is decreasing, R(0) is positive and R(γ) is negative. The government optimally smooths distortions
by running a surplus in peacetime and a deficit in wartime. For t even,
∞
r= t β
tR(gt) = 0, and for t odd,
∞
r=t β
tR(gt)=R ( γ) < 0. This implies that the Ramsey allocations solve the problem (4.15). From Proposition
4, the Ramsey allocations are sustainable. The debt issues are as follows. For t even,
tbt+1 =R ( γ)/Uc(c(γ), (γ) )<025
and tbs = 0 for all s ≥ t + 2. For t odd, tbs = 0 for all s ≥ t. Thus the government sells negative debt in
peacetime which exactly finances the wartime deficit and it sells zero debt in wartime. Notice that the debt
issues are always nonpositive.
In the next example, a slight variant of Example 1, the Ramsey allocations are not sustainable by
reversion to the Markov plan for any discount factor.
Example 2. Let gt = γ for t even and gt = 0 for t odd. Thus the economy starts in wartime then alternates
between peacetime and wartime. Let R(gt) denote the surplus function for this pattern of government





tR(gt) = R(0) > 0, and for t odd,
∞
r=tβ
tR(gt) = 0. Notice that the debt issues are as follows.
For t even,
tbt+1 = R(0)/Uc(c(0), (0)) > 0
and tbs = 0 for all s ≥ t + 2. For t odd, tbs = 0 for all s ≥ t. The government again runs a peacetime surplus
in peacetime and a wartime deficit. Since it begins in wartime, however, at date 0 it issues positive debt which
is financed by the peacetime surplus at date 1 and likewise for future dates. Suppose that at date 1 the
government defaults and follows the Markov plan from then on. From Example 1, we know that such a policy
gives the Ramsey allocations of that example. Thus, the original Ramsey plan is not sustainable by reversion
to the Markov plan. Intuitively, after the initial war the government can optimally smooth taxes from date 1
on with the nonpositive debt of Example 1. Thus at date 1 having inherited positive debt the government gains
by defaulting on the debt and suffers no loss from then on from losing the ability to issue positive debt. Of
course, in equilibrium consumers anticipate the date 1 default and buy no government debt at date 0 and thus
force the government to balance the budget at date 0.
In Examples 1 and 2, government consumption follows a two-period cycle. We now consider two
examples in which it follows a K-period cycle.26
Example 3. Let gt = γk for t = nk where k = 1, ..., K and the integer n > 0. Let 0 = γ1 < γ2 < ... < γk. Notice
that government consumption monotonically increases over each K-period cycle. Let R be decreasing under




Since R( ) is decreasing, we know that
K
k=r
βkR(γk) < 0, for r = 2, ..., K.
Hence, the Ramsey plan coincides with the Markov plan and thus is sustainable.
Example 4. Consider the same pattern of government consumption as in Example 3, except now let
government consumption start at some γj. That is, let gt = γt+J f o rt=1 ,. . . ,K−J ,a n dg t+J = γk for t = nk
where k = 1, ..., K, and the integer n ≥ 1. Again, under the Ramsey plan, the budget is balanced over each
K-period cycle:
R(γj)+βR(γJ+1) + ... + β
KR(γJ−1)=0 .
Notice that for appropriately chosen J, the debt will be positive under the Ramsey plan. Now consider a policy
similar to the one used in Example 2: default on the debt in period K − J and follow the Markov plan from
then on. Clearly, this Markov plan is simply the Ramsey plan of Example 3, and it yields higher utility than
does the continuation of the original Ramsey plan. Thus, the original Ramsey plan is not sustainable.
The intuition for Examples 3 and 4 is similar to that for Examples 1 and 2. In Example 3 the
economy begins in peacetime. Under commitment optimally financing of the gradually escalating war involves
selling nonpositive debt. These policies is sustainable without commitment. In Example 4 the economy starts
in the middle of the war and under commitment optimal financing would involve issuing positive debt during
the war. Under this plan at the end of the war the government sells positive debt into the next peacetime. In
this period of peace if there is no commitment the government finds it optimal to default on the inherited debt
and switch to the financing pattern of Example 3 which has nonpositive debt. Thus in the period of peace the
government gains from defaulting on the positive debt and, at least from this point onward, does not suffer any
loss from losing the ability to sell positive debt. Thus threats which specify that it will lose this ability are27
not sufficient to deter it from defaulting. In equilibrium, consumers anticipate the government default and do
not buy positive debt to begin with.
7. Other Equilibria
Thus far we have focused on a particular type of Markov equilibrium and equilibria which can be
sustained by reverting to this Markov equilibrium. Here we discuss some other equilibria of the model.
We begin with a two period example. Let g0 = 0 and g1 > 0. As in Example 1 for a variety of utility
functions the Ramsey plan has R0 < 0 and R1 > 0. The government runs a surplus at date 0 and the resulting
negative debt allows it to run a deficit at date 1. This plan is sustainable. To see that there is a possibility
of other equilibria consider working backwards from date 1. We will construct the equilibria in an intuitive
fashion and then relate our construction to the definition of sustainable equilibrium. In period 1 given inherited
debt 0b1 and facing policies τ1 and δ1 the consumer solves
U(c1, 1) (7.1) max
c1, 1
subject to
c1 − (1−τ1) 1 = (1−δ1)0b1. (7.2)
This problem has as a solution c1 =C 1(0b1,τ1,δ1) and 1 =L 1(0b1,τ1,δ1). In period 1 the government, given




τ1L1(0b1,τt,δ1)−g 1 = (1−δ1)0b1. (7.4)
This problem has as solution τ1 = Τ1(0b1) and δ1 = ∆1(0b1). At period 0 the consumer solves
max U(c0, 0)+βU(c1, 1) (7.5)
subject to
c0 − (1−τ0) 0 + 0q10 b1 = 0 (7.6)
c1 − (1−τ1) 1 = (1−δ1)0b1. (7.7)28
This generates decision rules for consumption, labor supply, and debt. We focus on the decision rule for debt
given by 0b1 =B ( τ0,0q1,τ1,δ1).

















1i f 0b1 >0
0i f − g < 0b1 ≤ 0
1+g 1/0b1 if 0b1 ≤ −g1
.
Thus, if the debt is positive the government defaults. If the debt is not too negative the government accepts
all of it. If, however, consumers owe the government more than the entire amount of government consumption
at date 1 the government forgives the amount which exceeds government consumption. Notice that if the
government did not forgive this portion then it would have to rebate it to consumers with distorting labor
subsidies. We will concentrate on equilibria in which government debt is negative and satisfies −g < 0b1 ≤
0 so that ∆1(0b1)=0 .
Consider now fixing τ0 = τ ¯0 and 0q1 = 0q ¯1. Denote the intersection of the consumer’s debt rule
B(τ ¯0,0q ¯1,τ1,0) and the government’s tax rule Τ1(0b1)b y0b ˆ
1 and τ ˆ1. Substituting for τ ˆ1 and setting δ ˆ
1 = 0 into
the consumers problem (7.5) gives allocations (c ˆ0,ˆ
0,0b ˆ
1,c ˆ1,ˆ
1). These allocations and the policies (τ ˆ1,δ ˆ
1) satisfy
consumer optimality at dates 0 and 1 given (¯ τ0,0q ¯1) and government optimality at date 1. Note that these are
conditions which any sustainable equilibrium must satisfy given the history (τ ¯0,0q ¯1). However, (τ ¯0,0q ¯1) do not
necessarily satisfy government optimality at date 0. Thus the final step in the construction is to adjust these
date 0 policies to solve the government’s date 0 problem. Now if the intersection of the consumer’s debt rule
and the government’s tax rule is unique for all (τ ¯0,0q ¯1) this construction yields a unique equilibrium. The more
interesting case is when the debt rule and the tax rule have multiple intersections. In this case for each (τ ¯0,0q ¯1)
we select one of the intersections. Given this selection the construction of date 0 allocations and policies is
the same. It is worth pointing out that by construction the Ramsey equilibrium is sustainable. Thus if the date29
0 policies are chosen to be the Ramsey policies, one of the intersections of the debt rule and the tax rule is
associated with the Ramsey debt allocation and date 1 tax policy.
Consider constructing equilibria for the following parametric example. Let




With δ1 = 0 the consumer’s date 1 decision rule for labor is




















With −g < 0b1 ≤ 0, the government’s decision rule for date 1 taxes Τ1(0b1) is implicitly defined by
0=0b1 +g 1 − τ1L1(0b1,τ1). (7.11)
The consumer’s date 0 decision rule for debt B(τ ¯0,0q ¯1,τ1,0) is implicitly defined by the first order condition
β/c1 = q/c0 or
β[(1−τ ¯0) 0 − 0q ¯1b] = 0q ¯1[(1−τ1) 1 + b] (7.12)
where 1 =L 1(0b1,τ1,0) and 0 = 0q ¯1b/(1−τ ¯0)+[ ( 0q ¯1b/(1−τ ¯0))
2 +4 / α1]
1/2.
We illustrate this construction with a numerical example. Let α0 =1 ,α1 = 0.7, β = 0.6, g0 = 0, and




1 = 0.46, 0q
r
1 = 1.08, and δ
r
1 = 0. In Figure 1 we graph the consumer





1. The intersection marked 1 gives the Ramsey tax τ
r
1 and the Ramsey debt 0b
r
1. More
interesting for our purposes is the other intersection marked 2. As we pointed out earlier the associated




1) and government optimality





The intuition for the multiple intersections is as follows. Consider first Τ1(0b1). If the government
inherits a large negative debt 0b1, it does not need to raise much revenues with taxes and chooses a small τ1.





1,τ1,0). If consumers anticipate a high tax on labor at date 1 they are poor and they30
choose low consumption and high labor supply in period 0. From their budget constraint (7.6) it follows that
they save relatively more, that is, since 0b1 is negative they borrow less. If consumers anticipate a low tax on
labor at date 1 the resulting wealth effect induces them to save less—which here means borrow more. Thus
B( ) is increasing in τ1. One intersection of these two functions yields the Ramsey outcome. Since both of
these functions are upward sloping it is not surprising that they intersect more than once.
The final step in constructing the second equilibrium is choose τ0 and 0q1 to maximize the




1, if the consumers expect the Ramsey tax rate
τ
r










1 if consumers anticipate the low tax rate at date 1, corresponding to the second intersection,
they reduce 0 and make 0b1 more negative. Thus, at the date 0 Ramsey policies, with such anticipations by
consumers, the government’s date 0 budget constraint would be violated. We thus vary τ0 and 0q1 and select
the lower tax rate from the intersections so as to maximize the government’s utility and meet its budget
constraint. For our parametric example the equilibrium outcomes turn out to be τ0 = 0.62, 0q1 = 0.73,
τ1 = 0.30, δ1 = 0. The utility of this equilibrium is 0.16 while that of the Ramsey equilibrium is 0.24.





1,τ1,0) intersect more than once. Both functions are increasing for all utility functions that
are concave and for which consumption and leisure are normal goods. It should be clear that the tax rule must
necessarily be increasing in the debt since a more negative debt means that the government has less need to
resort to distorting taxes. The result that the debt rule is increasing follows because consumption and leisure
are normal goods. It should not be surprising that a pair of increasing functions intersect more than once.
Experimentation with a variety of examples suggests that multiple intersections are the rule rather than the
exception. The two period setup is the simplest environment with a potential time inconsistency problem. The
apparent ease with which multiple equilibria arise in this setup suggests that multiplicity of equilibria is
pervasive even in finite horizon environments with sequential policymaking. It is worth pointing out that in31
this example even if we require that the government honor its debt, as in Lucas and Stokey [20], we get the
same equilibrium. Note also that the better equilibrium is the Markov equilibrium of Section 4. The bad
equilibrium is also a Markov equilibrium. From the construction in Section 4 it should be clear that the
equilibrium there is the best of the Markov equilibria.
It is also worth pointing out that the competitive behavior of private agents plays an important role
in generating this multiplicity. In our model, no single consumer perceives that his savings decision affects
the future tax rate, yet the aggregate savings does indeed affect the future tax rate. To see the importance of
this competitive behavior, consider instead a two period example such as ours with literally a single consumer.
This consumer would realize that his saving decision determines the future tax rate. Thus the consumer can
effectively pick the best point on the government’s policy rule T1(b) and there is a unique equilibrium. More
generally in a finite horizon game with only sequential moves if the best reply correspondence for each agent
at each node is single-valued, it is easy to see that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium which can
be obtained by backward induction.
Finally, note that in our example we have constructed equilibria with two types of selections from the
multiple intersections. In one we chose the high intersections for all date 0 policies while in the other we
chose the low intersection for all date 0 policies. More elaborate selection procedures which for some date 0
policies pick the high intersection and for others pick the low one will typically lead to more equilibria.
Now let us relate our construction to the definition of a sustainable equilibrium. A sustainable
equilibrium requires that the allocation rule f1(π0,π1) maximizes consumer utility for each history h1 =( π0,π1),
where the inherited debt is given by 0b1(π0). Therefore, we have
f1(π0,π1)=( C 1(0b1(π0),π1),L1(0b1(π0),π1)). (7.14)
The definition of sustainable equilibrium also requires that σ1(π0) maximizes date 1 welfare subject to the
government budget constraint given that consumer allocations are determined according to f1 and that inherited
debt is 0b1(π0). Thus,
σ1(π0)=( T 1(0b1(π0),∆1(0b1(π0)). (7.15)32
This definition also requires that at date 0 given π0 consumer decisions are optimal given the future history
h1 =( π0,σ1(π0)). Thus, for example, 0b1(π0)=B ( π0,σ1(π0)). Substituting this relation into (7.15) gives
σ1(π0)=( T 1(B(π0,σ1(π0)),∆1(B(π0,σ1(π0))). (7.16)
Solving this fixed point equation for each π0 gives the function σ1. In our example for each π0 there are two
such fixed points, one which corresponds to the higher intersection and one which corresponds to the lower
intersection. Given that, say, σ ˆ 1 is a fixed point to this equation the consumer period decision rules at date 0
such as the debt rule are of the form 0b1(π0)=B ( π0,σ ˆ 1(π0)). Faced with such decision rules government
optimality at date 0 gives the equilibrium policy, say π ˆ0. The equilibrium policy outcome is (π ˆ0,σ ˆ 1(π ˆ0)).
Consider now the pattern of government consumption in Example 2. Namely let it start at the high
level of government consumption and then alternate between 0 and some high level of consumption. In
Example 2 we showed that in the revert-to-Markov equilibrium the government’s budget was balanced at date
0 and from date 1 on the government followed what would be the Ramsey policies if the economy began at
date 1 with zero inherited debt. One might think that there are no other sustainable equilibria. To see that
this need not be true consider the following argument. Suppose the government at date 1 inherits positive debt.
One might think that the government would default on this debt and then switch to the policies given in
Example 2. This is the optimal policy, of course, when consumer’s allocations are given by the revert-to-
Markov allocation rules. Suppose instead that if the government defaults the consumer allocation rule
prescribes choosing the allocations corresponding to the lower intersection in Figure 1. For high enough
discount factors the current gain from defaulting on the debt is outweighed by the losses of switching to this
bad equilibrium forever. In fact for suitable parameter values positive debt can be sustained and for high
enough discount factors it is even possible to sustain the Ramsey equilibrium outcomes starting at date 0.
Notice that here we have constructed trigger equilibria along the lines of Benoit and Krishna [6]. Of
course, one could use complicated triggers to construct many others.33
8. Conclusion
For nearly a decade economists, using differing levels of formality, have used trigger mechanism
arguments for a variety of macroeconomic issues. Almost all of the formal literature, however, has analyzed
these trigger arguments by using the repeated static game models similar to those used in the industrial
organization literature. (See, for example, Barro and Gordon [5], and Backus and Driffill [3].) While this
literature was a useful first step it is not obvious that its insights carry over to standard macromodels which
are inherently dynamic. The classic papers on time consistency (including Kydland and Prescott [22]; Calvo
[8]; Lucas and Stokey [20]; and Persson, Persson, and Svensson [21]) use standard general equilibrium
macromodels with state variables such as capital, money, or debt. These models give rise to dynamic games
and not repeated static games.
The point of this paper is to analyze the role of trigger mechanism arguments in resolving a classic
problem in the time consistency literature, namely, the incentives for governments to default on their debt.
We have analyzed these arguments in the simplest version of the classic general equilibrium macromodels.
We have shown that in such a model reputational arguments work in a more subtle way than they do in
repeated models. To see the difference between our results and those from repeated static models note that
in repeated games even if there are multiple equilibria in the static game, reversion to any of the multiple
equilibria supports good outcomes when there is sufficiently little discounting. In our model regardless of the
discount factor reverting to the (best) Markov equilibrium cannot support the Ramsey outcome. It seems likely
that trigger mechanism arguments will be even more subtle in more elaborate general equilibrium macromodels.
We also find it interesting that even in the simplest dynamic model with a finite horizon, multiple
equilibria seem to be the norm rather than the exception. This feature means that even in finite horizon models
the set of sustainable equilibria is large and difficult to characterize. In particular, this set cannot be
characterized solely by simple backward induction arguments. We think that more complicated versions of
this model with money or capital added will share similar features. In this vein notice that the multiplicity of34
equilibria in the finite horizon version of our model does not arise from the ability of the government to default
on its debt.
Finally, in this paper, we have adopted the standard approach in the time consistency literature by
assuming that all the commitment problems lie with the government. In a related paper, Chari and Kehoe [11],
we examined an environment in which both private agents and the government can default on their debts, and
we obtained quite different results. In particular, we showed that Ramsey equilibrium with positive debt can
be supported with sufficiently little discounting. One reason for the difference is that in that model, private
agents always default on their debts and thus government debt can only be promises to pay by the government.
Since the government can default, these nonbinding promises do not constrain the policies available to the
government. In contrast, in the present paper, consumers’ promises to pay are enforceable and thus influence
the policies available to the government. The differing results in the two papers illustrates that there is a
delicate interplay between the nature of commitment technologies and the sustainability of good outcomes.
It is worth exploring this interplay in future research.35
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. Let {cs, s}
∞
s=t solve (4.15). We will show that there exists a debt sequence s−1b for
s=t+1 ,. . .which along with the given allocations satisfies (4.10)–(4.13). The hard part is to show that the
continuation allocations to the solution of (4.15) satisfy (4.13). To show this, we will construct functions
V ˆ
r(r−1b) which are at least as large as Vr(r−1b) for all r−1b ,r=t+1 ,t+2 ,..., and show that the continuation
allocations to (4.15) yield utility equal to V ˆ
r(r−1b). We use the following programming problem to construct
these functions. Consider then
V ˆ














sRs ≤ 0 , t=r+1 ,r+2 ,. . .. (A4)
∞
s=t
Using (4.14) it is clear that the constraints in problem (A1) are more relaxed than the constraints in
problem (4.8). It follows that V ˆ
r(r−1b) ≥ Vr(r−1b) for all r−1b. So we are done if we can construct a debt
sequence satisfying (4.10)–(4.12) which together with the allocations solving (4.15) yields the same utility as
(A1) at datesr=t+1 ,t+2 ,....
Consider the first order conditions to problem (4.15). Let T1 denote the first date at which (4.18)
binds. Between dates t and T1 − 1 these are
(Uc+U ) + λ(Rc+R ) = 0 (A5)
where the derivatives of U and R are evaluated at (cs, s) and λ is the Lagrange multiplier on (4.17). From
the definition of R, it follows that (A5) can be written as
(1+λ)(Uc+U ) + λ[c(Ucc+Uc ) + (U +Uc )] = 0. (A6)
Using normality, we have that the expression in square brackets in (A6) is negative. Since λ >0 ,U c +U ≥
0 and, from (A5), Rc +R ≤ 0. We use these facts to construct tb. Let tbs = 0 for s ≥ T1. For s < T1 we36
construct tb together with Lagrange multiplier λ ˆ for constraint (A3) of problem (A1) at t + 1 so that the
solution to (A1) coincides with (4.15). Suppose, therefore, that these solutions coincide. Evaluating the
first-order conditions for the datet+1version of (A1) at the solutions to (4.15) gives
(Uc+U ) + λ ˆ(Rc+R ) − λ ˆ(Ucc+Uc )tbs = 0. (A7)
Equation (A7) can be rearranged to get
λ ˆ[tbs−as]=( U c+U )/(Ucc+Uc ) (A8)
wherea=( R c+R )/(Ucc+Uc ). Next, multiply (A8) by β
sUc a n ds u mf r o mt+1through T1 − 1 and use (A3)
to uniquely define λ ˆ as follows
(A9) ˆ λ =
T1−1




Recall that by hypothesis, constraint (4.18) does not bind from dates t + 1 to T1 − 1. Thus, βsRs ≤ 0.
T1−1
t+1
We have already shown Rc +R ≤ 0, and since normality implies Ucc +U c ≤ 0, we have that as ≥ 0 for all
s, and therefore λ ˆ ≥ 0. Then use (A8) to define tbs for any s from t + 1 through T1 − 1. Since t−1bs = tbs =0
for s ≥ T, the first order conditions to (4.15) and (A1) coincide for s ≥ T1.
We can use similar arguments to show that the continuation allocations of (4.15) also solve (A1) for
r ≥ t+2 .37
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